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Abstract
Underlying Searle’s theory of mind there is the general idea that the intentionality
of human agents underlies their relation to the world. Following Brentano
（1874）intentionality is, according to Searle（1993）, the property by which our
mental states, perceptions and actions are directed towards objects and facts of
reality. There are two kinds of conceptual thoughts directed towards objects and
facts of the world: intentional states like propositional attitudes such as beliefs,
desires and intentions that we have, and intentional acts like illocutionary acts
such as assertions, directives, promises, declarations and thanks that we make
in the exercise of thought and the use of language. These two kinds of
conceptual thoughts are logically linked. Indeed whoever succeeds in performing
an illocutionary act（the most important kind of speech acts）must intend and
attempt to perform that act in an appropriate context and express the attitudes
determined by its sincerity conditions. Despite these logical links, Searle
advocates that unlike propositional attitudes illocutionary acts are not intrinsically
intentional, i. e. that their power to represent is not intrinsic to these acts
themselves, but is rather derived from the intentionality of the mind. We will
challenge his view by arguing on the basis of the fact that instances of illocutions
are necessarily intentional actions. We will raise the questions : What about
the intrinsic intention-in-action of their agents ? What is their specific form of
intentionality ? Why are illocutionary acts different from other speech acts like
utterance acts that are not always intentional ? How is meaning related to
intentionality and illocutionary acts ? Our main goal here will be to explain why
tokens of illocutions are intrinsically intentional actions.
＊ Candida de Sousa Melo, Professor at Federal University of Paraiba. candida.jaci@gmail.com
＊＊ Daniel Vanderveken, Professor at Université du Québec and Federal University of Rio Grande
do Norte. daniel.vanderveken@gmail.com
This work is composed of five parts : The introduction exposes the theme,
subject and scope ; the second section explains the distinction between sentence
meaning and speaker meaning ; the third section deals with the different kinds of
speech acts ; the fourth section explains why the directions of fit between ideas and
things underlie the directions of fit between words and things and the fifth section
contains our final considerations about the intrinsic intentionality of meaning and
illocutionary acts. The bibliographical references come at the end.
1．Introduction
In the contemporary philosophy of mind, intentionality and consciousness are
fundamental distinctive features of the human mind. Thanks to intentionality we
are directed towards objects and facts of reality in two modes : by sensorial
perception , and by conceptual representation . When we have conscious visual,
oral, auditory, gustative and tactile perceptions, we have sensorial presentations of
objects and facts. Of course, the subjective features of our conscious sensorial
impressions are distinct from the features of perceived objects. However, in order
to be real our perceptions and sensorial presentations of objects and facts must be
caused by existing objects and facts of the world. Otherwise, our experience would
not be a real perception, but a hallucination.
However, when we have propositional attitudes like beliefs, desires and
intentions, when we make conceptual acts like judgements, decisions, approvals
and choices, and perform elementary illocutionary acts like assertions, promises,
requests and definitions, we refer to things under concepts and we predicate
properties of things in expressing a whole propositional content which can be
true or false. We will mainly be concerned here with propositional attitudes
and elementary illocutions which are paradigmatic elementary conceptual thoughts.
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Propositional attitudes are mental states, which have a psychological mode, while
elementary illocutions are mental acts, which have an illocutionary force , in addition
to a propositional content. As Frege（1918－23）pointed out, we always indirectly
refer to objects and represent facts through senses in expressing propositions.
So concepts that we conceive as well as properties and relations that we predicate
of objects of reference are propositional constituents of our conceptual thoughts.
Unlike the sensorial presentations of our real perceptions, the representations of our
conceptual thoughts need not represent existing facts. We can refer to things under
concepts which are deprived of denotation and we can predicate properties of things
that they do not have. Our real propositional attitudes and elementary illocutions
can have a false propositional content1）. They need not be satisfied and correspond
to an existing fact of the world. The notion of satisfaction is a generalisation of the
traditional notion of truth which applies to all psychological modes and illocutionary
forces. Our beliefs are satisfied whenever they are true, our desires whenever they
are realized and our intentions whenever they are executed . As Vanderveken
（2006,2008）pointed out, attitudes have logically related conditions of possession
and of satisfaction. Whoever possesses a real propositional attitude must relate in a
certain way its propositional content to the world with its psychological mode and
think how things are or will be in the world if that attitude were satisfied. Our
assertive illocutions are satisfied when they are true, our promises when they are
kept and our directives when they are followed . As Searle and Vanderveken
（1985）pointed out in Foundations of Illocutionary Logic, in order to perform at a
given moment an elementary illocution at a moment, we have to make certain
1）Sometimes we refer to things that are not even possible. So we can believe and assert
necessarily false propositions and even desire and promise to carry out impossible actions.
When we do that we just wrongly think that their propositional content is possible. As
Vanderveken（2009,2011） pointed out, human speakers are imperfectly rational and not
omniscient.
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constitutive mental acts in relating to the world its propositional content with its
force（mainly to achieve the illocutionary point of its force on its propositional
content）and think how things are or will be in the world if our illocution were
satisfied. According to illocutionary logic, the felicity conditions of illocutionary
acts are their conditions of success and of non defective performance in addition to
their conditions of satisfaction.
Searle（1983） presents in Intentionality both a logical and an ontological
analysis of intentionality. In his view intentionality is first of all a biological
property of our mind which enables us to have a subjective access to the world
thanks to our five senses, our conceptual representations, and our power to act.
This is why we can perceive and represent things and facts and transform them
thanks to our actions. Most of our attempts to move the body（for example
of producing sounds）are not properly conceptual voluntary actions. There are
presentations rather than representations of the attempted movement. However our
attempts to perform illocutions are conceptual, because we need to express their
propositional content in order to represent their satisfaction conditions. As Searle
pointed out, the mind is more fundamental than language so that philosophy of
language is a branch of philosophy of mind. The representational power of
language comes from the intentionality of competent speakers. Searle（1983,22）
puts this point very clearly when he explains why his approach avoids the infinite
regress problem raised by Dennett2）:
2）See D. Dennett（1978,122－124）to know his criticism of Searle’s account of intentionality
in terms of representation. In short, Dennett points out that Searle’s analysis leads to the
Hume’s problem or what he calls an infinite regress of homunculi. About what is the
problem concerned ? Well, according to Dennett, the explanation of propositional attitudes as
representation implies that must have an agent who uses them as a representation. The theory
requires then the existence of a mysterious homunculus with its own intentionality in order that it
can use an intentional state as representation. The problem is that each homunculus has to have
further intentional states in order to use the original intentional states as representations and this
leads to an infinite regress.
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On my account, the Intentional content which determines the conditions of
satisfaction is internal to the Intentional state : there is no way the agent can
have a belief or a desire without having its conditions of satisfaction. （…）
A belief is intrinsically a representation in this sense : it simply consists in
an Intentional content and a psychological mode. The content determines its
conditions of satisfaction, and that mode determines that those conditions of
satisfaction are represented with a certain direction of fit. It does not require
some outside Intentionality in order to become a representation, because if it is
a belief it already intrinsically is a representation. Nor does it require some
intentional entity, some formal or syntactical object, associated with the belief.
The false premise in the argument in short is the one that says that in order for
there to be a representation there must be some agent who uses some entity
as a representation. This is true of pictures and sentence, i. e., of derived
Intentionality, but not of Intentional states. We might wish to restrict the term
“representation” to those cases as pictures and sentences where we can make a
distinction between the entity and its representative content, but this is not a
distinction we can make for beliefs and desires qua beliefs and desires because
the representative content of the belief or the desire isn’t in that way separable
from the belief or desire. To say that the agent is conscious of the conditions
of satisfaction of his conscious beliefs and desires is not to say that he has to
have second order Intentional states about his first order states of belief and
desire. If it were, we should indeed get an infinite regress. Rather the
consciousness of the conditions of satisfaction is part of the conscious belief or
the desire, since the Intentional content is intern to the states in question.
Clearly sentences are syntactic entities（linguistic objects）, which can represent
facts and express illocutionary acts with satisfaction conditions, but their
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representational and expressive character is not intrinsic to them. It depends
on social conventions. However Searle goes farther because his distinction
between propositional attitudes and illocutionary acts also concerns their form of
intentionality : the way they represent.（1983,27）:
There is an obvious disanalogy between Intentional states and speech acts,
which is suggested by the very terminology we have been employing. Mental
states are states, and speech acts are acts, i. e., intentional performances.
And this difference has an important consequence for the way that the speech
act is related to its physical realization. The actual performance in which the
speech act is made will involve the production（or use or presentation）of some
physical entity, such as noises made through the mouth or marks on paper.
Beliefs, fears, hopes, and desires on the other hand are intrinsically Intentional.
To characterize them as beliefs, fears, hopes, and desires is already to ascribe
Intentionality to them. But speech acts have a physical level of realization,
qua speech acts, that is not intrinsically Intentional. （…） An utterance
can have Intentionality, just as a belief has Intentionality, but whereas the
Intentionality of the belief is intrinsic the Intentionality of the utterance is
derived .（Our italics）.
One problem with Searle’s approach is that he only considers public instances
of illocutionary acts in a context of utterance. As Vanderveken（1990）pointed
out3）, illocutionary acts are above all acts of conceptual thoughts that we often can
perform alone in thinking without saying anything. We can make privately without
3）Vanderveken（1990,56）says bluntly : “Before being the primary units of meaning in the use
of natural languages and other semiotic systems, illocutionary acts are also primary units of
conceptual thoughts”.
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any public utterance elementary illocutionary acts like assertions, decisions and
choices that are not essentially addressed to a hearer. Their successful performance
just requires an exercise of thought in an appropriate context where the speaker can
make all mental acts required by their success conditions. Of course, there is a
valid principle of expressibility of illocutionary acts in speech act theory. Our
successful private illocutionary acts are in principle expressible by language use
because they have well determined felicity conditions. Otherwise we would not
know what we mean. We would not be able to determine their felicity conditions.
So we can always express our private elementary illocutionary acts by making
public illocutions. Only illocutionary acts like promises and orders which are
necessarily addressed to a hearer require a public performance when the hearer in
question is different from the speaker. In that case one cannot mean and attempt to
perform the illocutionary act without intending to communicate to that hearer our
meaning intention. Thus in standard speech act theory in order to mean something
and perform illocutionary acts we must before all think conceptually. But we need
not always make a public utterance.
Searle（1969）has developed his theory of speech acts by using and revising the
analysis of speech acts of his Oxford professors J. L. Austin（1961,1962）and H. P.
Grice（1989）. Like Austin, Searle was much influenced by G. Frege（1884,1892,
1918－23）and L. Wittgenstein（1953）. Following Frege, Austin pointed out that
the basic units of meaning and communication in the use and comprehension
of language are illocutionary acts4） which have felicity conditions rather than
propositions having truth conditions. Opposed to Wittgenstein’s skepticism, Searle
（1969）began in Speech Acts his theoretical analysis of felicity conditions of
4）The term of illocutionary act was introduced by Austin but the very term of force and the idea
that speakers try to perform speech acts with a force in meaningful utterances of different
syntactic types of elementary sentences is already in Frege’s work.
On the Intrinsically Intentional Nature of Illocutionary Acts 65
illocutionary acts. Later in（1979） Searle revised the traditional analysis of
satisfaction conditions of illocutionary acts in terms of correspondence between
words and objects by paying attention to the possible directions of fit of illocutions.
Against Wittgenstein’s skeptical ideas, Searle（1979）defends that there are
only five basic illocutionary points（the assertive, the commissive, the directive, the
declaratory and the expressive illocutionary points）that speakers can attempt to
achieve on a propositional content in a meaningful utterance because there are only
four possible directions of fit or ways from which they can intend to establish a
correspondence between words of language that they use and things of reality
to which they refer. The words-to-things direction of fit is specific to assertive
illocutionary acts which serve to represent how things are or will be in the world.
The things-to-words direction of fit is specific to commissive and directive
illocutionary acts which serve to commit the speaker（in the commissive case）,
and to try to get the hearer（in the directive case）to perform an action in the world
in order to change represented things so that they come to correspond to uttered
words. The double direction of fit is specific to declaratory illocutionary acts
which serve to transform the world by bringing about at the moment of utterance
the fact represented by the propositional content in virtue of the very utterance.
The empty direction of fit is specific to expressive illocutionary acts, which just
serve to express the speaker’s propositional attitudes about the fact represented by
the propositional content. Because the speaker presupposes the existence of the
represented fact, he or she does not want to establish a correspondence in the
expressive case.
Searle（1983）recognizes that his approach on language use and meaning was
incomplete before. Indeed, a complete explanation of illocutionary acts requires a
full account of how our mind relates our expressed ideas to represented things in the
world. Before Searle had just analysed the relation between the language and the
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world in terms of relations between uttered words（acoustic signs or sounds coming
out of our mouths or graphic signs or marks on material objects）and represented
things, events or facts of reality without considering that intentionality is constitutive
of these relations. As Searle says, one of his objectives in Intentionality（1983,
vii）is :
（…）to provide a foundation for my two early books, Speech Acts（Cambridge
University Press,1969）and Expression and Meaning（Cambridge University
Press,1979）, as well as for future investigations of these topics. A basic
assumption behind my approach to problems of language is that the philosophy
of language is a branch of the philosophy of mind. The capacity of speech
acts to represent objects and states of affairs in the world is an extension of the
more biologically fundamental capacities of the mind（or brain）to relate the
organism to the world by way of such mental states as beliefs and desires, and
specifically through action and perception. Since speech acts are a type of
human action, and since the capacity of speech acts to represent objects and
states of affairs is part of a more general capacity of the mind to relate the
organism to the world, any complete account of speech and language requires
an account of how the mind/brain relates the organism to reality.”（Our
italics）.
One important consequence from this theoretical change is that Searle plans to
explain the semantic character of language in intentional terms. So the directions
of fit between language（words）and reality（things）are henceforth based on the
directions of fit between our mind（our ideas and thoughts）and the world（things
and facts）. This is directly linked with the role that intentionality plays in meaning.
For any accurate analysis of linguistic meaning must recognize that sentence
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meaning is conventional and that speaker meaning in an utterance is an extension of
meaning of the used sentence. Our mind by thinking about reality links the
propositional content to represented things of the world with a psychological mode
or illocutionary force.
In order to explain the nature of illocutionary acts one must take into account
the fact that they are necessarily intentional actions. However Searle（1983）mainly
deals with intentional or voluntary actions without defining their very nature. He
also does not explain why we perform involuntary actions. We will now briefly
outline Vanderveken（2005,2011,2014）’s general logic of action and attitudes5）
which contains a theory of successful performance of intentional actions and
explains the different forms of generation of actions, whether voluntary or not and
how actions are related to attitudes. We now need to integrate illocutionary logic
within a general logic of actions and attitudes6）. On Vanderveken’s view, in order
to be intentional or voluntary an instance of an action must be attempted by its
agent. Agents who attempt to perform a certain action can of course fail . They
only succeed in performing an intentional action whenever they make a good
attempt in an appropriate context. We often perform involuntary actions which
we do not attempt. We can involuntarily slip and fall while walking on the ice.
However unlike many other actions, illocutionary acts are intrinsically intentional in
the sense that they are personal and only can be performed intentionally. Speakers
are engaged in social forms of life and activities governed by conventional rules.
Sometimes, they make utterances which given established rules commit themselves
socially to be agents of illocutionary acts that they did not at all want to perform.
Thus, a sleepy teacher who raises his arm to scratch his head at the moment of a
vote for a motion, in a departmental assembly, can involuntarily vote for that
5）His new first level illocutionary logic contains that general logic of action and attitudes.
6）This is the objective of Vanderveken’s next book Speech Acts in Dialogue.
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motion. Even if he protests later, other protagonists of the departmental meeting
can consider that his gesture counts as a positive vote, no matter that he was not
then aware of the vote. In our view, speakers do not really personally perform
such involuntary illocutionary acts. They are just socially committed to them given
rules of forms of life.
According to Vanderveken（2005,2008,2014）, at the basis of all human
actions there are attempts, which are very special intentional actions. In his own
words（2014,332）:
（…）attempts are actions that agents make（rather than attitudes that they
have）. Attempts are actions of a very especial kind : personal, conscious,
intentional, free and successful. Only the agent can make his or her individual
attempts. No one else can make them. （…） Attempts are intrinsically
intentional actions. There are no involuntarily attempts. When an agent
makes an attempt, he or she makes that attempt in order to do something else.
Attempts are means to achieve ends. （…）An attempt is essentially a mental
act. Whoever attempts to raise the arm can fail because of an external force.
But he or she has anyway mentally made that attempt in forming consciously
his or her present intention to raise the arm. Among intentional actions,
attempts have then particular success conditions. It is enough to try to make
an attempt to make it eo ipso . Direct attempts by an agent to move parts of
one’s body are real basic actions. When an agent forms the present intention
to make a direct movement, an attempt is caused by the very formation of that
intention, no matter whether he or she is in a standard condition or not
（Goldman,1970,65）. In case the agent of an attempt fails to reach his or her
objective, his or her attempt is then unsatisfied . In order to make a satisfied
attempt, one must make a good attempt in a right circumstance. （…）When
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agents attempt to perform illocutions, the satisfaction conditions of their
attempted action are in that case the so called success conditions of their
attempted illocutions. Agents often have an experience of their attempt when
they fail（Searle1982）. Such an experience presents or represents the
satisfaction conditions of that attempt.
In making intentional actions agents bring about facts in the world. But, as
philosophers of action like A. Goldman, Searle（1983）, D. Davidson（1980） and
Bratman（1987）pointed out, in order to succeed to bring about a fact, it is not
enough that we attempt and that the fact turns to be existent. It must also be the
case that the fact happens because of our own attempt. Sometimes a fact of nature
or another agent brought about the attempted fact. In that case our attempt was not
satisfied and we did not really succeed in making our attempted action. In order to
be satisfied our attempt must be at least one cause of the existence of the attempted
fact. In case the attempted fact happens for other reasons and not just because
of our own attempt there is causal over determination. In this case, the attempted
fact would have happened even if we had not made our attempt. According to
Vanderveken, the subjective intention in action of agents of illocutionary acts lies
in their attempts to perform these acts.
Very often we intentionally perform an action in order to perform another. For
example, we move our fingers in order to make graphic marks on paper and make a
written utterance. Our voluntary actions are linked by the relation of being means
to achieve ends. So we voluntarily make utterances in order to attempt to perform
public illocutionary acts. Moreover, our intentional actions have unintended effects.
We often perform involuntary actions that we did not attempt. By refusing an offer
we can unwillingly upset the hearer and make an involuntary perlocutionary act.
Some types of actions contain others. We cannot swim without moving and we
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cannot reason without thinking. Furthermore, some tokens of actions generate
others. Whoever asserts a proposition, which is past relative to the moment of
utterance thus makes then a report.
In order to explain our theory of meaning and use we need to apply C. S. Peirce
（1931－1935）’s distinction between type and token to actions and attitudes as well as
to expressions, senses and denotations. Just as we must distinguish between a
sentence of a language considered as an abstract type and its written or oral
utterances which are its tokens in contexts of use of that language, we must also
distinguish between the abstract type of an action or of an attitude and its possible
particular tokens or instances in the world when agents come to perform that action
or to have that attitude. Just as many different agents can make an utterance of the
same sentence type at different moments of time, they can perform an instance of
the same action type and have an instance of the same attitude type at different
moments or periods of time.
Like D. Kaplan（1979） Vanderveken distinguishes the linguistic meaning
of a sentence type from the particular meaning of that sentence in a context.
Clearly sentences with demonstratives and indexical expressions express different
propositional contents in different contexts. In their view, all sentences have a
meaning in each context, no matter whether or not they are uttered by the speaker
in that context. According to speech act theory, each complete literal（oral, written
or gestural）utterance of a sentence in a context is, in principle, a particular attempt
by the speaker to perform an instance of the illocutionary act expressed by that
sentence in that context. In Vanderveken and Searle（1985）’s view, a literal
utterance of a sentence token is successful if and only if the speaker succeeds in
performing a token of the illocutionary act expressed by that sentence in the
utterance context. In that case the success conditions of the type of that expressed
illocution are fulfilled in the context. According to illocutionary logic, each
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illocutionary force has six components which serve to determine felicity conditions
of illocutions with that force. In order to perform a successful illocutionary act
token of the form F（P） in a context the speaker must then 1）achieve the
illocutionary point of force on the propositional content with the proper mode
of achievement of F ,2）express a propositional content P which satisfies the
propositional content condition of F ,3）presuppose that the preparatory conditions
of F（P）obtain and express with required degree of strength of F all attitudes of
the form M（P）that have a psychological mode M which enters in the sincerity
conditions of F .
Following Descartes’s Traité des passions（1649）, both Searle and Vanderveken
distinguish two kinds of propositional attitudes, cognitive attitudes like conviction,
confidence, knowledge, certainty, presumption, surprise, prevision and expectation
which are mainly beliefs and volitive attitudes like wish, will, intention, hope,
pleasure, enjoyment, amusement, fear and sorrow which are mainly desires. In
philosophy of mind, beliefs have the proper ideas-to-things direction of fit. Agents
who possess a cognitive attitude represent how things are then according to them in
the world. Their attitudes are satisfied when their ideas correspond then to the
things as they are or they will be in the world. On the contrary, desires have the
opposite things-to-mind direction of fit. So volitive attitudes are satisfied only if
things in the world come to correspond to the ideas of their agent. Each direction
of fit between the mind and the world determines which side is at fault in case of
dissatisfaction. When a belief turns out to be false, the agent is at fault, not the
world. He or she should have other ideas about things. In that case, the agent
easily corrects the situation in changing his or her beliefs. On the contrary, when
a desire turns out to be unrealized, it is not the agent but the world which is at
fault. Objects should be different. The agent sometimes corrects the situation in
changing or abandoning his or her desire. Otherwise he or she remains unsatisfied.
72 言語文化研究 第38巻 第1－2号
According to Vanderveken, psychological modes divide into other components
than their basic Cartesian category of cognition or volition which determine other
conditions of possession. Complex psychological modes can have a special way
of believing or desiring, special conditions on their propositional content or special
preparatory conditions. We feel our beliefs and desires in a lot of special cognitive
and volitive ways. Thus, knowledge is a belief based on strong evidence that gives
confidence to the agent and moreover guarantees truth. Whoever has an intention
feels such a strong desire that he or she is disposed to act sooner or later in order to
satisfy that desire. Like illocutionary forces, psychological modes also have special
propositional content and preparatory conditions. Previsions like predictions are
directed towards the real future. Intentions are desires to carry out a present or
future action. Any agent of an attitude or of an illocution presupposes certain
propositions. His or her attitude and illocution would be defective if these
propositions were then false. Thus promises and intentions have the preparatory
condition that their agent is then able to do the action represented by their
propositional content. In order to possess a cognitive（or volitive）attitude of the
form M（P）at a moment m an agent must then believe（or desire）the propositional
content P and feels that belief（or desire）in the cognitive or volitive way proper to
psychological mode M , the proposition P must then satisfy propositional content
conditions of M and finally that agent must then presuppose and believe all
propositions determined by preparatory conditions of mode M with respect to the
content P . Thus an agent intends P at a moment when P then represents a present
or future action of that agent, he or she desires so much that action that he or she is
committed to carrying it out and moreover that agent then presupposes and believes
to be able to carry it out.
Let’s summarize our assumptions up to this point :1）We, human beings,
thanks to our intentionality, have states and make acts of conceptual thought. 2）
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We possess under certain conditions propositional attitudes like beliefs, desires and
intentions which are conceptual states. 3）Among our conceptual acts of thoughts
we make private and public elementary illocutionary acts like judgments, decisions,
and directives as well as attempts to perform speech acts. 4）Our utterance acts are
not necessarily intentional. One can involuntarily utter words and sentences that
we do not even understand. 5）One must distinguish between abstract types and
tokens or instances of conceptual thoughts. 6）The intentionality of conceptual
thoughts is not intrinsic to their abstract type but is derived from the mind of
the agent who generates their tokens. 7）Instances of propositional attitudes are
intrinsically intentional because their agents relate their propositional content to the
world with a psychological mode in establishing a correspondence from a direction
fit between their ideas and represented things. 8）So are instances of attempts
to perform illocutionary acts because their agents form their intention in action
to perform them. 9）Unlike attempts illocutionary acts have success conditions
which need to be fulfilled in order to be successfully performed. We can either
succeed or fail to perform our elementary illocutions at the moment of the attempt.
10）In order to perform illocutionary acts it is not enough to attempt and to represent
their felicity conditions. 11）Their agent must make a good attempt in an
appropriate context. 12）In order to possess a propositional attitude at a moment
it is not enough to represent its conditions of satisfaction. We must personally
relate its propositional content to the world with its psychological mode in the
way required by all possession conditions of that attitude. There are impossible
propositional attitudes that we can never have（for example desires whose
propositional content is a priori necessarily true）. There are also propositional
attitudes that we can only have at certain moments（for example previsions whose
content must be future at the moment of possession）. However we can represent
their satisfaction conditions.
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2．On the distinction between sentence meaning and speaker meaning
Since Grice（1957）and Austin（1961,1962）meaning and understanding are
logically related to agents’ intentionality. Clearly the words of any language do not
have an intrinsic meaning. They are bearers of meaning in virtue of conventions
adopted by the linguistic community of that language which require the intentionality
of their competent agents7）. Moreover the particular meaning of an utterance
depends on the speaker’s intentions, when he or she uses ambiguous words or
variables8）.
Austin（1962）relates the meaning and understanding of utterances of sentences
to illocutionary acts. Austin was much influenced by Frege’s（1892,1918－1923）
considerations on meaning9）. In Frege’s philosophy of language（Dummett :1982）,
forces, senses and denotations are the three basic components of sentence and
speaker meaning. According to Austin’s original classification of speech acts,
speakers who make a meaningful use of language perform three kinds of speech
acts that he called locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. They make
locutionary acts which contain phonetic acts of producing sounds, phatic acts of
uttering words and rhetic acts of using words in order to refer and predicate. But
they mainly attempt to perform intentional illocutionary acts which have felicity
conditions. They mean to perform illocutionary acts and by way of attempting
them they produce effects on the hearers, which are perlocutionary acts. They can
please and influence their audience. Unlike illocutionary acts perlocutionary acts
can be voluntary or involuntary.
7）We follow conventions that are adopted often because of previous declarations.
8）In order to understand such an utterance we need to know in which sense the speaker used the
ambiguous word and which value he gave to that variable.
9）See by P. Geach & M. Black（1970）.
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In Grice’s approach the meaning and understanding of utterances of sentences
are derived from the speakers and hearer’s attitudes and actions as well as from
adopted linguistic conventions10）. In particular the meaning of an utterances is
related to the speaker’s intentions in the context. More specifically according to
Grice the speaker’s meaning in a context is a particular propositional attitude of
that speaker, namely his or her intention to produce certain perlocutionary effects
on the hearer（ s）. Whoever makes an assertion intends to convince the hearer of
the truth of the asserted proposition. Whoever gives an order intends to influence
the hearer’s behaviour by attempting to get him or her to carry out the ordered
action. Whoever assures something intends to make the hearer sure of that thing.
According to Grice, speakers who make meaningful utterances intend to perform
perlocutionary acts which would change hearers’ attitudes.
In our conception natural language has two essential functions : to give to
speakers adequate means to express and to communicate their conceptual thoughts.
In speech act theory in order to mean and communicate something speakers must
attempt to perform public illocutionary acts. Thus, in order to fulfill its two
functions, every language must be provided with a structure and lexicon which give
means to speakers to perform illocutionary acts. Moreover competent speakers must
be provided with reason11）.
Searle’s（1969）theory of speech acts belongs to the trend of ordinary language
use founded by G. E. Moore（1903）and L. Wittgenstein（1953）according to which
meaning is related to use. Searle advocates in Speech Acts Frege and Austin’s
analysis of meaning. However Searle（1969） only analyzed the literal use of
language. An agent who speaks literally means exactly what he or she says. He
10）After Grice approaches, meaning cross henceforth the fields of philosophy of mind, of action
and language.
11）See Vanderveken（2002）’s considerations on universal grammar.
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or she just attempts then to perform the illocutionary act expressed by the uttered
sentence. Searle did not adopt the Gricean analysis of speaker meaning.
Successful utterances only must achieve one perlocutionary effect on the hearer,
namely that he or she understands the illocutionary act attempted by the speaker.
So the agent of a successful assertion need not convince the hearer. Later Searle
changed his analysis in separating the meaning from the communication intention.
But in（1969）he did not explicitly explain meaning in terms of intentionality（even
if he was embracing Grice’s ideas on the matter）. His analysis of speaker meaning
is triply intentional. First, the agent tries to perform the illocutionary act expressed
by the complete sentence that he or she uses in the context of utterance. Second,
he or she tries to get the hearer to recognize his or her illocutionary intention.
Third, he or she also tries to bring about this recognition through the hearer’s
comprehension of the meaning of the sentence used in the context.
In his second book Expression and Meaning , Searle（1979）expands his theory
of meaning by analyzing non-literal speech acts such as ironies, metaphors or
indirect illocutionary acts. He pays attention to the conversational background of
meaningful utterances（the forms of life in which speakers and hearers are engaged,
the linguistic and factual information that they mutually shared）and their capacity to
make inferences respecting conversational maxims while conducting a conversation.
In （1979） he takes into account Grice’s（1969） approach of meaning and
understanding in using Grice’s conversational maxims . Grice used Kant’s four
categories of cooperation, quality, quantity, manner and relation in order to present
his maxims. Searle adds to speech act theory Grice’s maxims. According to
Searle, the speaker tries to get the hearer to recognize his or her intention to perform
a non-literal illocutionary act by relying on various capacities of the interlocutor.
First the linguistic competence and the conversational background knowledge of the
hearer enables him or her to understand the nature of the literal illocutionary act
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expressed by the uttered sentence in the context and also to recognize that certain
facts（mutually known or assumed）prevent the speaker to speak literally. Second
his or her capacity to make inferences leads the hearer to conclude that given the
conversational background the speaker must then want to perform primarily instead
of the literal act another illocutionary act, which nature is perfectly compatible with
the respect of conversational maxims in the context of utterance. On this basis,
Searle analyzed in（1979）the nature of three style figures : irony, metaphor, and
indirect illocutions.
In Intentionality, Searle（1983）made a decisive move, which improved his
analysis of meaning. His new approach that follows Grice（1969）is shared by us.
See Vanderveken（1990,2005）and de Sousa Melo（2002,2014）12）. We agree
that speaker meaning is more important than sentence meaning. What matters is
what we mean when we use words. We also agree that meaningful utterances
serve to attempt to perform expressed illocutionary acts. But when we say that
illocutions are intrinsically intentional, we want to insist that the very intentionality
of illocutionary acts is intrinsic to and derived from the intentionality of the mind of
the agents of their instances in the world. So illocutionary acts are the primary
units of meaning and communication because their tokens are intentional actions of
their agents in the world. Like instances of propositional attitudes, instances of
illocutionary acts have an intrinsic intentionality because of the intentionality of their
agents. Searle surprises here and he is not at all clear when he claims that the
intentionality proper to illocutionary acts is not intrinsic to them. We will challenge
his claim.
12）See Vanderveken（1990,2005）and de Sousa Melo（2002,2014）.
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3．On the difference between illocutionary acts and other kinds
of speech acts
Because they are the basic units of meaning and communication in natural
languages, illocutionary acts are the most important kind of speech acts. Let us
now present the classification of speech acts and explain how illocutionary acts are
related to other speech acts like acts of utterance, of reference and of predication,
acts to express propositions or attitudes, attempts to perform illocutionary acts and
perlocutionary acts.
In Speech Acts, Searle（1969）presents his first theory of meaning. Like
Austin and Frege he relates meaning and understanding to speech acts of the
kind called by（Austin,1962）illocutionary act. He points out that in order to
mean something and express or communicate our thoughts, speakers must try to
perform illocutionary acts. So he claims that all elementary sentences contain
an illocutionary force marker. Moreover Searle criticises Austin’s classification of
speech acts and especially the notion of locutionary act and proposes to consider
instead other speech acts like acts of utterances and propositional acts. According
to Searle（1969）, in attempting to perform an illocutionary act, we intend to
accomplish four distinct types of speech acts :（1）an act of utterance,（2）a
propositional act,（3）an act of expressing attitudes and（4）an illocutionary act
including the perlocutionary act of getting the hearer to understand our illocutionary
attempt. An utterance act consists in the production of an oral, gestural or written
token of a well-formed expression or sentence type, in general. A propositional act
consists in expressing a propositional content by making acts of reference and of
predication. In performing elementary illocutionary acts speakers also express
verbally attitudes. In performing assertive, commissive and directive illocutions
speakers express respectively beliefs, intentions and desires. They are sincere only
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if they really possess expressed attitudes. So illocutionary acts have so-called
sincerity conditions. The fact that speakers verbally express attitudes in performing
an illocution is shown by Moore’s paradox. Utterances like “I promise but I do not
intend to come” are self-defeating because no one can simultaneously express an
attitude and deny to possess it.
Searle’s account of propositional acts is based on Frege’s theory of senses.
Like Strawson（1971）he claims that by uttering well-formed sentences, we refer to
objects under concepts and predicate properties or relations to them. We make
indirect acts of reference by using referential expressions such as proper names,
pronouns and definite descriptions which have a sense. When we speak literally,
the reference act consists in referring to the object that is the denotation of the
referential expression that we use. The act of predication consists in attributing
a property or a relation to objects of reference. A literal predication act is
accomplished by predicating the attribute expressed by a used predicative expression
such as “is free”, “loves” to a used referential expression. Acts of reference and
of predication are constitutive of propositional acts. However, as Searle says in
（1969, 29）: “The expression of a proposition is a propositional act, not an
illocutionary act”. Propositional acts are part of illocutionary acts. Moreover
we cannot make a propositional act without attempting to perform an illocutionary
act13）.
Searle has established a bridge between speech act theory and the theory of
senses and denotations of Frege and his followers. Henceforth the natural language
trend can exploit the resources of the truth theory developed in the logical trend of
contemporary philosophy. In philosophy of natural language, especially in speech
act theory, we assign to propositions a double role : they are both the senses of
13）As Searle（1969, p.29） says explicitly : “When a proposition is expressed, it is always
expressed in the performance of an illocutionary act”.
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clauses of sentences in contexts as well as the content of propositional attitudes and
illocutionary acts. Searle also defends the principle that it is always possible for
us to express literally what we mean by the means of language. Each attempted
illocutionary act has well determined felicity conditions and hence is, in principle,
expressible.
Searle’s principle of expressibility of thoughts is a development of a
fundamental thesis of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus（1922）: the
limits of language impose limits to thoughts14）. According to Searle, we human
being must in principle be able to express clearly our conceptual thoughts if
necessary by enriching the actual expressive powers of our language. Of course,
private illocutionary acts can be performed only in thought without any public use
of language. However, they have the same logical form of public illocutionary
acts.
As we know, machines and computers which are deprived of reason can utter
sentences and participate in intelligent dialogues with human agents. They can
apparently answer questions, give information and even directives. Do they really
perform illocutionary acts and possess expressed attitudes ? According to Searle
（1984）computers which are deprived of intentionality do not really think, they do
not really refer and predicate and they do not really perform and understand
illocutionary acts. They can only manipulate syntactic symbols and utter sentences
in certain conditions following instructions of a program. They just can function as
if they were performing and understanding illocutionary acts. Their behavior is not
a real performance or understanding but a simulation , because “（…）there are no
actions without intentions” Searle（1983,82）. According to Searle（1983）, any
14）See proposition §4．116 of the Tractatus “Everything that can be thought at all can be
thought clearly. Everything that can be put into words can be put into words clearly.” and my
forthcoming paper with D. Vanderveken “On the limits of language, thought and experience”
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experience of acting in an intentional action contains an intention in action. What
is an intention in action à la Searle ? As Vanderveken（2008）pointed out, the
psychological mode of intention is a complex volitive mode. It has a special
volitive way. Whoever has an intention feels such a strong desire that he or she is
disposed to act sooner or later in order to realize his or her desire. Sometimes the
agent intends to act the very moment of his or her intention. He or she has then a
present intention that Searle calls an intention in action . The special propositional
content condition of an intention of action is that its propositional content represents
a present action of the agent at the moment of the intention. Sometimes the agent
intends to act at a later moment. He or she has then a prior intention . In
Vanderveken’s view, one cannot have an intention in action without trying to
execute it at that very moment. So an intention in action is both a mental state and
a mental act. It is essentially an attempt to perform an action at the very moment
of the attempt.
4．On the directions of fit between mind or language and reality
As we have pointed out, from an ontological point of view, language is
dependent on mind. Not only are natural languages are public institutions created
by linguistic communities whose competent speakers are provided with a mind, but,
without intentionality and conscience agents could not make meaningful utterances
and would be unable to have and to make conceptual thoughts.
Consequently the directions of fit between the language and the world
characteristic of elementary illocutionary acts are founded on similar directions of
fit between the mind of their agents and the world. Agents of assertive illocutions
express beliefs. Like cognitive attitudes assertive illocutions have the ideas-to-
things direction of fit. Their agents mean to express ideas which correspond to the
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way things are or will be in the world. Agents of commissive and directive
utterances express volitive attitudes. Like volitive utterances commissive and
directive illocutions have the opposite things-to-ideas direction of fit. Their agents
mean that the objects of the world to which they refer are or will be as they
represent them. Agents of elementary declarations both express and execute at
the very moment of utterance their intention to make the action represented by
their propositional content. As de Sousa Melo（2002） pointed out, elementary
declarations have the double direction of fit between ideas and things15）. Their
agents change referred things at the moment and in virtue of their utterance just
by predicating of them a property. In that case things come to correspond to
the agent’s ideas because he or she expresses them. By making new definitions
we can create new notions that were inexpressible before. Expressive elementary
illocutions serve to express propositional attitudes. As we would expect, expressive
elementary illocutions have the empty direction of fit between ideas and things
because they presuppose the existence of the fact which inspired the expressed
attitudes. However expressed propositional attitudes often have a direction of fit.
Most cognitive attitudes which contain a belief have the ideas-to-things direction of
fit. Most volitive attitudes which contain a desire have the things-to-ideas direction
of fit. But there are propositional attitudes like pleasure, satisfaction, joy, gladness
and pride which have empty direction of fit between ideas and things. Agents who
are pleased, satisfied and proud of a fact do not establish a correspondence between
their ideas and things in the world. They just presuppose and believe that the
desired fact exists. Such attitudes have the special preparatory condition that
their propositional content is then true. Attitudes with such special preparatory
conditions have the empty direction of fit. They do not have real satisfaction-
15）Searle only speaks of the double direction of fit between words and things. He does not
consider the double direction of fit between words and things.
On the Intrinsically Intentional Nature of Illocutionary Acts 83
conditions. They are just appropriate or inappropriate. They are appropriate
when their preparatory condition of actual truth or falsehood is fulfilled and when
their proper psychological mode suits the represented fact. No agent should be
proud of an action that he has not made.
In Intentionality, Searle introduces a new notion of intentional causation ,
which is distinct from the traditional notion of physical causation in philosophy
of science. According to Searle, in both perception and intentional action,
agents experience a causal relationship which is not inferred from regularity but is
inherent in their sensorial sensation or experience of acting. When we consciously
perceive and act, we have a direct experience of perceiving or acting and that
“（…）experience of perceiving or acting is precisely an experience of causation.”
（Searle :1983,123－5）. As D. Hume（1738,1748）pointed out, physical causation
is inferred from observed regularity. Physical causes are events which cause other
events because of the laws of nature. Their effects are in general future events in
the history of the world. Unlike physical causality, intentional causation is not
inductively inferred. There is indeed a logical relation between cause and effect
in the cases of intentional causation which explains why it is directly experienced.
“… for example, in the case of prior intention and intention in action, the cause
contains a representation or presentation of the effect in its condition of satisfaction
and in perception and memory the effect contains a representation or presentation of
the cause in its condition of satisfaction.”（Searle :1983,126）.
Searle’s account of intentional causation is opposed to the traditional account of
causation based on Hume’s considerations :1）In perceiving or acting we experience
the causal relationship. “It is not in the observation of actions that we become
aware of causation, it is in the performance of actions, for part of the intentional
content of the experience of acting when I perform intentional actions is that
this experience causes the bodily movement.”（1983,124）. Causation is then
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observable contrary to what Hume says16）. 2）To change things and to bring about
facts is the very essence of causation. 3）The causal relation in perception and
in action is logical contrary to what Hume says. Moreover in that case the cause
and the effect are simultaneous. “…I am not simply saying that the description of
the cause is internally related to the description of the effect, but rather that the
causes and effects themselves are in this way internally related, since the one is a
presentation or representation of the other.（1983,126）.
As Searle pointed out, the directions of fit and of causality between the mind
and the world of our perceptions and conceptual thoughts are asymmetric. That
asymmetry is of course not accidental but necessary. It is related to the nature of
their intentional component. On one hand, our successful actions have the world-to
-mind direction of fit and the mind-to-world direction of causation. When we
change things in order to be as we want them, our attempt must be a cause of that
change. On the other hand, our perceptions have the mind-to-world direction of fit
but the world-to-mind direction of causation. When we see things as they are, our
visual sensation must be caused by a real fact.
5．Conclusions
Let us draw our main conclusions about the intentionality of states and acts of
conceptual thoughts on the basis of previous considerations. We followed Searle’s
approach according to which philosophy of language is inseparable from philosophy
of mind and of action. We agree with Searle that linguistic meaning is dependent
on the mind of competent speakers who are provided with intentionality and
16）Hume claims that we never can observe a causal link between events, but only regular chains
of events. So in formulating laws of nature we make inductive inferences and presume that the
future will be like the past.
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consciousness17）. Clearly only intentional agents can have propositional attitudes
and make successful voluntary actions and illocutions. However we disagree
with Searle’s claim that unlike propositional attitudes illocutionary acts are not
intrinsically intentional. In order to clarify our analysis we have distinguished
between the abstract types and the tokens of our attitudes and actions. In our
view, the very intentionality of our propositional attitudes, voluntary actions and
elementary illocutionary acts is intrinsic to the mind of the agents of their tokens at a
moment of utterance. Abstract types of attitudes, actions and illocutions are of
course deprived of intentionality.
We agree with Searle that each instance of a propositional attitudes is
intrinsically intentional because the agent relates its propositional content to the
world with its psychological mode in establishing a correspondence from a direction
fit between his or her ideas and represented things. However we do not think like
Searle that in order to possess a propositional attitude at a given moment it is
enough to represent under which conditions that attitude is then satisfied. As we
pointed out, propositional attitudes have a few possession conditions which are
well determined by the few components of their modes. In order to possess a
propositional attitude at a moment an agent must personally relate its propositional
content to the world with its psychological mode in such a way that all possession
conditions of that attitude are then fulfilled. We can represent the satisfaction
conditions of many impossible propositional attitudes but we could never possess
them. For example, because of our minimal rationality, we cannot believe in the
truth of an analytically false proposition（for example that it is now raining and not
raining）which is a priori false. Similarly because desires are preferences, we can
17）Unlike successful intentional actions, which are always conscious, human agents have
unconscious attitudes. Because they can always in principle express their unconscious thoughts,
intentionality and consciousness are inseparable.
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never possess a desire whose propositional content is a priori necessarily true（for
example to be or not to be）.18） There are also propositional attitudes that we cannot
have at certain moments. For example, we cannot now intend to have done
something yesterday. But we can represent how one could execute that impossible
intention.
As we have already said, instances of attempts are intrinsically intentional
because their agents necessarily form their intention in action in making them.
Moreover attempts are very special intentional actions which are personal, voluntary,
free and necessarily successful. Only the agent can personally make his or her
own attempt ; no one else can make it. Nobody can make an involuntary attempt.
Whoever attempts to do something could have not made that attempt. Whoever
attempts to make an attempt succeeds in making it. Now our analysis of speaker’s
meaning is different from that of Searle because we relate speaker meaning to
attempted illocutions rather than to successful illocutions. Searle did not pay any
attention to the important speech act which consists in attempting to perform an
illocution in a context of utterance. According to us, that speech act is constitutive
of speaker’s meaning. In our view a speaker means something at a moment of
utterance if and only if he or she attempts then to perform an illocution, no matter
whether he or she succeeds or fails. In order to mean something we just need to
attempt to perform an expressed illocution. For that purpose it is sufficient to form
the intention to make that attempt. It is not necessary to succeed in performing
18）Volitive attitudes require a preference. Whoever desires something distinguishes eo ipso two
different ways in which represented objects could be in the world. In the preferred ways,
objects are in the world as the agent desires, in the other ways, they are not. The agent’s desire
is realized in the first case, it is unrealized in the second case. Thus in order that an agent
desires the fact represented by a proposition P at a moment m, it is not enough that he or she
has then in mind all attributes and concepts of P and that the proposition P is true at that
moment in all worlds compatible with realization of his or her desire at that moment. That
proposition must moreover be false in at least one circumstance according to that agent.
Otherwise that agent would not prefer the existence of the represented fact.
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that attempted illocution. Whoever says that he gives you something makes a
meaningful utterance even when he has no right to give that thing to you. We
mean to perform a public illocutionary act when we attempt to use words in order to
perform it. Incidentally, unlike illocutions which can in general be performed by
several agents, our acts of meaning are private, in the sense that only an agent
himself can mean what he means in making an utterance. Other speakers could
attempt to perform the same illocution in different contexts but they would make
their attempts by making different voluntary movements of their body.
Instances of intentional actions are intrinsically intentional because they are
attempted by their agents who necessarily form an intention in action of making
them at the moment of their performance. Unlike attempts, we can fail to perform
many intentional actions and most illocutionary acts. However we could not make
an intentional action without making an intrinsically intentional attempt to make it.
In order to succeed at a moment, we just must make a good attempt and use
appropriate means in order to achieve our objective at that moment. In that case we
do not just form the intention of action to make that action, but we make a good
attempt which causes in the world the existence of facts required by its conditions of
satisfaction.
Because they are intentional actions, instances of elementary illocutionary acts
are intrinsically intentional . Their agents necessarily attempt to perform them at
the moment of their action. As we pointed out, most illocutionary acts have
success conditions which need to be fulfilled in order to be successfully performed.
In order to succeed an instance of illocutionary act of the form F（P）at a moment
an agent must use appropriate words in the right context. In particular he or
she must succeed in making all mental acts required by its success conditions at
the moment of utterance. For example he or she must succeed to achieve the
illocutionary point of force F on the propositional content P with the mode of
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achievement of their force F and proposition P must satisfy the propositional
content conditions of F in the context of utterance.
Our final conclusion is opposed to Searle’s claim, instances of both illocutionary
acts and propositional attitudes are intrinsically intentional.
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